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Challenges and Opportunities 
 
The author of the Foreign Voices’ second issue, Lulzim Peci from the Kosovar Institute for 
Policy Research and Development, was a speaker at the Development and Peace Foundation’s 
Potsdam Spring Dialogues 2006 entitled “The Balkans at a Crossroads – Prospects for a Las-
ting Peace” held on  16-18 March 2006. During the Dialogues, several participants - among 
them Former Foreign Minister of Serbia and Montenegro Goran Svilanovic – pointed at the 
importance of security sector reforms in the countries of the region. In the following, Mr Peci 
presents his view on how the process of reforming the security sector in Kosovo should be 
shaped, and which specific preconditions have to be taken into account to make this process as 
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Prishtina 
”Monitoring is not a sufficient capacity building 
instrument” 
  
Since June 1999 Kosovo is administered in accordance with the provisions of United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (UNSCR 1244), under the authority of 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, with the objective to pacify a threat to international 
peace and security.  Due to this character of the international presence in Kosovo, the 
UN has not been greatly involved in the process of genuine state-building. Short-term 
stability and security were given priority over democratic state-building. As a conse-
quence, almost seven years after the establishment of UN administration in Kosovo, 
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there is a serious local institutional capacity gap and duality in governance, with 
responsibilities split between local and international authorities.  
However, during this period, responsibilities in many areas were gradually transferred 
to local authorities, with security and justice being exceptions to this trend until 2005. 
Internal security sector reform, negotiations for Kosovo’s status and transfer of com-
petencies in the field of security and justice all have started in the second part of 2005. 
Specifically, in July 2005 the Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR) process was 
launched by the Special Representative of the UN-Secretary General (SRSG) Søren 
Jessen-Petersen whereas negotiations about Kosovo’s final status commenced in Sep-
tember 2005. In December 2005, the gradual transfer of competencies in these two 
fields began through the establishment of the Ministry of Interior Affairs and the 
Ministry of Justice of Kosovo.   
The final shape of the current security sector reform in Kosovo can be finalized only 
when the status talks are completed and the settlement is recognized by the interna-
tional community. Therefore, it is expected that several steps of the ISSR process may 
have to be reviewed during the status negotiations. In case the talks lead to the inde-
pendence of Kosovo, which most of international analysts expect, the ISSR might 
evolve into a full fledged security sector reform.  
The interrelation of the ISSR with the status talks makes the process very dynamic and 
reversible. On the one hand, this might be seen as an opportunity to feed the status 
talks with the security dimension, which is one of the key issues of the future settle-
ment of Kosovo.  On the other hand, this interrelation can appear as a threat for the 
ISSR process and the quality of expected outputs because of the pressure already 
exercised by the Contact Group and the Office of the UN Special Envoy for Kosovo’s 
Status Talks, Former Finnish President Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, to adjust timing of ISSR 
with the status talks. 
Current Institutional Setup 
Security Providers  
Kosovo’s security sector is heavily dominated by international actors as a direct result 
of the 1999 conflict settlement. The UNSCR 1244 specifies the entire public security 
apparatus, including the judiciary, police services, prison system and emergency servi-
ces as “reserved functions” of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK). 
The most important security provider, the Kosovo Force (KFOR), a contingent of mili-
tary forces from NATO and non-NATO countries, was established in 1999 to secure 
Kosovo in the immediate aftermath of the international military intervention in Former 
Yugoslavia. KFOR’s mandate and objectives are set out in UNSCR 1244, Section 9 and 
Annex 1, which empowers it with responsibilities for: deterring hostilities and enfor-
cing the ceasefire, demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), establishing a 
secure environment for refugee returns, ensuring public safety, supervising de-mining, 
supporting the international civil presence, conducting border monitoring, and ensu-
ring freedom of movement. Hence, KFOR has a mixed external defense and internal 
security role. It provides a deterrent to any offensive longings in Serbia, secures parts 
of the border (although this is being transitioned to the police), provides stationary and 
mobile protection to minority communities, and finally acts as a potential back-up to 
UNMIK Police and Kosovo Police Service in the eventuality that military assistance to 
the civil power is required during large man-made or natural disturbances.  
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The second international security provider is the Civilian Police (CIVPOL), which also 
was established under the provisions of UNSCR 1244. It required the creation of an 
international civilian police service in Kosovo under UN administration, to be gradual-
ly replaced by local units under the guidance of the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) over 
time. The UNMIK police responsibilities are: routine policing and criminal investiga-
tion via its civilian police (CIVPOL) units; high-risk policing in situations such as 
crowd control during violent demonstrations and civil unrest, for which it employs 
special police units; and ensuring compliance with immigration laws and border 
regulations (the responsibility of its border police).  
The most important local security provider is the Kosovo Police Service. However, 
CIVPOL and KPS can be considered as being of the same structure; both of them are 
led by an international police commissioner. But there has been a real and significant 
transfer of powers from UNMIK police to KPS in recent years, which is changing the 
shape of the security architecture in Kosovo. The UNMIK police presence has substan-
tially decreased in parallel with a growth of KPS. KPS now has operational control of 
some 80% of police activities in Kosovo. Although many key positions remain in the 
hands of internationals, this makes the policing architecture almost entirely local.  
The other security provider is the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC/TMK). The KPC is a 
civil emergency organization with military structure and military ranks, established 
following an ‘undertaking’ signed in 1999 by the KLA commander-in-chief and the 
Commander of KFOR as a means to demilitarize and transform the KLA. The legal 
foundation for establishing KPC is  UNMIK Regulation 1999/8, which states that the 
KPC is “a civilian emergency service agency, the tasks of which shall be to: provide 
disaster response services; perform search and rescue; provide a capacity for humani-
tarian assistance in isolated areas; assist in de-mining; contribute to rebuilding infra-
structure and communities.”  
However, while the international community continues to regard the KPC as a civil 
emergency organization as its current mandate dictates, the KPC’s self-perception, and 
that of Kosovar Albanians at large, is that of an army-in-waiting. In spite of a growing 
number of Kosovo Serbs involved in the KPC, most of them tend to regard it with deep 
mistrust. The solution to this problem of opposing perceptions can only be found by 
putting the future of KPC at the centre of the security sector reform in Kosovo.  
Aside from the aforementioned organizations a number of non-mandatory and illegal 
intelligence services operate in Kosovo. Firstly, Serbia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs 
(MUP) and intelligence operatives are carrying out activities throughout the territory 
of Kosovo, though this is in clear and direct violation of the Kumanovo Military Tech-
nical Agreement. This involvement of Belgrade is a demonstration of Serbia’s political 
campaign to maintain ‘parallel structures’ in Kosovo, as much as to gather intelligence. 
In addition, two major Kosovar political parties, namely the Democratic League of 
Kosovo (LDK) and the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) have acquired intelligence 
capabilities, and their “shadowy intelligence services” are a public secret. Namely, the 
Institute for Strategic Research of Public Opinion (IHSOP) is affiliated with the LDK, 
whereas the Kosovo Information Service (SHIK) is affiliated closely with the PDK. The 
IHSOP originates from the former Ministry of Defence (part of Kosovo’s Government 
in exile), the SHIK has emerged from the KLA, having as its head a member of the 
cabinet of the Provisional Government established by Mr. Hashim Thaqi in 1999. 
Operations and existence of non-mandatory Kosovar “shadowy security services” and 
political and intelligence subversion exercised by Serbia through their illegal and paral-
lel structures may easily bring Kosovo to the brink of failure.  
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Key Oversight Actors 
Civil control of security and the justice sector until recently was exercised entirely by 
UNMIK’s Pillar I (Police and Justice) which continues to act as a quasi “Supra Ministry 
of Justice and Interior”. In December 2005, the Ministry of Interior Affairs and the Mi-
nistry of Justice were established within the Kosovo Government. They are expected to 
gradually engage in exercising oversight responsibilities.  
However, the UNMIK will not transfer full competencies to the newly created minis-
tries until the end of the year, and an international police commissioner will continue 
to carry out the command over the KPS. In addition, the commissioner will remain 
responsible to the SRSG and not to the Minister of Interior Affairs. The Minister of the 
Interior and two deputy ministers are elected by the Kosovo Assembly, one of them 
being from the Kosovo Serb community. The appointment of a Kosovo Serb as a de-
puty minister is a further step towards building trust by all communities in the emer-
ging democratic oversight of security institutions in Kosovo. In line with gradual trans-
fer of competencies from UNMIK to Kosovar institutions, in November 2005 the Parlia-
mentary Committee on Security was established.    
Hence, in the near and medium future the internal affairs will remain under the control 
of the international community. Moreover, the European Union has indicated that the 
priority of the future ESDP Mission in Kosovo will be justice and police, hereby indica-
ting further involvement of the international community in these fields. There is no 
doubt that there is a need for further capacity building of local institutions. However, 
the ESDP mission in Kosovo should not focus only on monitoring but rather on 
coaching and joint task exercising in policing. Monitoring as such is not a sufficient 
capacity building instrument.   
Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR) Process  
Due to the unresolved status of the Kosovo the security sector reform is currently limi-
ted to its internal component. The ISSR framework is prepared by the Security Sector 
Development Advisory Team of the British Government. The framework envisions an 
eight stages process: Conducting Strategic Environment Review, Determining Security 
Threats, Developing Internal Security Policy Framework, Developing Individual Insti-
tutions/Agency Policy Framework, Conducting Gap Analyses, Establishing Develop-
ment Strategies, Determining Costs and Confirming Affordability and Implement Se-
curity Sector Development Strategies.  
The ISSR process has a policy research and consultative component with the communi-
ties in Kosovo. It aims to ensure a democratic security sector reform through an inclu-
sive consultative process that will provide the ground for trust and confidence buil-
ding between ethnicities in Kosovo and its neighbors and the international community. 
The consultative process is supposed to build a basis for a “social contract” between 
citizens and the security policies and architecture so that the latter will protect all 
people and will be trusted by them, which has an utmost importance in the post-con-
flict environment of Kosovo. 
The outputs of the policy research and consultative process are approved by the ISSR 
Steering Committee, which is composed by the Head of UNMIK SRSG Petersen, the 
President, the Prime-Minister, the President of Parliament, the Minister of Finance, the 
Commander of KFOR, the Head of the OSCE Mission, the Head of UNMIK’s Pillar on 
Economic Development, leaders of opposition, representatives of Serbian and other 
minorities political parties, as well as a representative of the Serbian Orthodox Church 
in Kosovo. The composition of the Steering Committee is devised in a way to ensure 
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representation of key stakeholders and interests in building Kosovo’s security sector, 
which is a unique case.  
The ISSR is not focused only on security institutions and traditional threats but it rather 
has a holistic approach. Strategic Environment Review and Security Threats Assess-
ment explore a wide range of issues such as political security, social security, economic 
security, ethnic security, environmental security as well as security institutions.  
The initial findings are showing that Kosovo faces a number of potential security 
threats. Firstly, political extremism and terrorist organizations linked to it are imme-
diate security threats directly related to the ongoing final status talks and their after-
math. Secondly, parallel security structures and political subversion exercised by Ser-
bia coupled with ethnic non-integration are a serious threat for Kosovo’s aspiration to 
become a stable state entity.   
As far as long term security threats are concerned, unemployment, economic under-
development and organized crime are top priorities. However, current findings reveal 
that Kosovo is not a source of international terrorism, religious fundamentalism or the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
Conclusion 
The expectations of the ISSR process will be fully met if its outputs and the new securi-
ty architecture of Kosovo will address concerns of its citizens and ethnic communities 
as well as if the same are embraced by them. In this case Kosovo could create capacity 
to become a net security provider that will increase regional and international security. 
In this respect, current and future capacity gaps in the security architecture of Kosovo 
have to be seriously addressed by the ongoing security sector review and reform. This 
particularly applies as the presence of international community will be phasing out in 
the years to come.  
However, the achievement of those expectations will depend on the outcome of the 
status talks, Kosovo’s efforts to build a stable state with a strong rule of law implemen-
tation capacity, policies of Belgrade towards Kosovo and the Kosovo Serbian Commu-
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